Judicial Mediation of Religious Freedom and Governmental Authority in the United States by Zitta, Victor
Marquette Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 3 Winter 1966 Article 4
Judicial Mediation of Religious Freedom and
Governmental Authority in the United States
Victor Zitta
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Victor Zitta, Judicial Mediation of Religious Freedom and Governmental Authority in the United States, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 543 (1966).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol49/iss3/4
JUDICIAL MEDIATION OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY IN THE UNITED STATES
PROFESSOR VICTOR ZITTA**
The constitutional tradition of the United States has numerous
interesting and telling examples which illustrate how a political society
copes with the problem of freedom and authority. And it is in the area
of religious freedom that the constitutional problems tackled by the
courts reveal the real character of American society and government.
"Of all our liberties," maintains Leo Pfeffer, this country's leading
authority on questions of church and state, "perhaps the most important
is religious liberty."' He goes even one step further, saying that it is
also "the progeniter of most other civil liberties."'2 It is hard to con-
ceive a society which can attain a measure of freedom, particularly
religious freedom, and satisfy all its members optimally. The political
requirements of a society's subsistence will forever complicate the tend-
ency of man to liberate himself from authority. Leo Pfeffer correctly
maintains taht "social living means that individual desires regardless of
their motivation will be curbed in the interests of the community."3 We
may impetuously though humanly stake a fictive claim in an absolute
realm and affirm it apodictically, but in the daily realities of a shared
existence, where bread has to be broken and only some wine can be
drunk, our claim dissolves. Nevertheless, it is a fascinating exercise
to trace the American experience in this area of tensionful, dynamic
relationship between religious freedom and governmental authority.
In every society one may trace three types of limitations upon reli-
gious freedom: one arising from activities of individuals, another from
activities of organizations, and the most weighty arising from the acti--
vities of the government. Anyone practicing religion is bound to en-
counter (or inflict) some or all of these types of potential limitation. In
a society in which religious freedom clashes with any one of these and
where this clash may constitute a litigable controversy to be settled in
the courts which are easily (and inexpensively) accessible to anyone,
settled through painstaking and conscientious familiarization with the
detailed facts involved in such a controversy, by professionals, whose
* This is a paper originally prepared for a graduate seminar in American Con-
stitutional Law at the University of Michigan and subsequently read, in a
somewhat revised version, at the annual dinner of the Lalumier Club in Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin, May 7, 1965.
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, College
Park, Maryland.
'PFEFFER, THE LIBERTIES OF AN AmERICAN 31 (1956).
2 Ibid.
3 Id. at 48.
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training, character, and intelligence has been subject to long-lasting
formal and informal scrutiny and observation and whose political and
psychological independence from the government and other groups
of the day is as much insured as such independence is capable of being
insured-in such a society religious freedom and human freedom in
general will have a fairly good chance of being maximized. The limita-
tions upon religious freedom in such a society will, most likely, be kept
at a tolerable point. It would seem that the American constitutional
experiment in this area is not only interesting; it is also successful and
pedagogically valuable.
The first sentence of the first amendment of the American Con-
stitution succinctly prescribes: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
With this provision, proposed and adopted in the First Congress of the
United States, and soon after ratified, "the United States furnishes the
first example in history of a government deliberately depriving itself
of all legislative control over religion."' 4 Its intent was to prevent reli-
gion from dividing society. Religious freedom is to be insured by a
twofold provision of the amendment, one prohibiting congressional or
legislative encroachment into the domain of its pursuit, the other pro-
scribing Congress from establishing religion by legislation. The full
concept of the American constitutional notion of religious freedom is
thus breached by a twofold aspect: neither of which can be fully under-
stood if taken singly, and both of which are mutually presupposing. It
establishes freedom for religion, as well as freedom from religion.
That is to say, the government has been constitutionally prohibited to
either burden or benefit religion.5
I FREEDOM FOR RELIGION
While these constitutional limitations upon Congress and upon the
legislatures of the different states (upon the legislatures due to the in-
fusion of the first amendment, applicable only to Congress, into the
'due process' clause of the fourteenth amendment, applicable to the
states)' speak in plain language, their meaning-in exposition and ap-
4 SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1888).
5 See Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 52(1947) ; HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1956); Van Alstyne, Con-
stitutional Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Posi-
tion, 57 A.at. POL. Sci. REv. 865, 867-68 (1963).
GThe federal courts have often raised the question of whether the first ten
amendments "ought to be construed as to restrain the legislative power of
a state, as well as that of the United States." Barron v. City of Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). Chief Justice Marshall in the Barron case
refused to apply the "due process" clause of the fifth amendment to protect
an individual against a municipality, because "these amendments contain no
expression indicating an intention to apply them to state governments." Supra
at 250. Justice Catron in Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589
(1844) confirmed this rule. However, after the fourteenth amendment the
Court tacitly acknowledged the applicability of the first amendment as a re-
straint upon the states in matters of religion even though it sustained an Idaho
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plication-is complicated, filled with potential controversy, and unyield-
ing to generalizations. "The word religion," claims Justice Waite in
Reynolds v. United States7----pinpointing one of the most important
problems here arising-'is not defined in the constitution." Judge
Learned Hand claimed that "religious belief arises from a sense of
inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his fel-
low men and to his universe . . [It] may justly be regarded as a re-
sponse of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or
God." 9 Obviously, religion is not something entirely private, but re-
lated to other individuals through some overt form of communication,
articulated symbolically, ritualistically and in other malleable forms of
human expression and activity. This is why it is hard to disentangle the
concept of religion from the notion of "church" which contrasts harshly
with a definition of religion that makes it a strictly private, purely indi-
vidual affair. If the function of religion is to relate human beings to
other human beings, and to God, it is hard to see how one could then
settle with a definition of "religion" which omits reference to a context
of interpersonal relationships without which no human expression or
activity could find meaningful reflection and realization. The constitu-
tion itself, when referring to religion in the first amendment, speaks of
its "free exercise." However, the Supreme Court of the United States
has furthered a notion of religion, particularly in Everson v. Board of
Education."0 which served to obfuscate issues, as will be shown. Ac-
cording to this notion religion is purely a matter of private conscience.
Among the several types of limitations upon the "free exercise" of
religious activity, the most significant and most difficult to evade is
provided by governmental authorities, both local and national. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that, while the Supreme Court of the United
States declared numerous acts of state legislatures or local governmental
authorities unconstitutional, it has never annuled an act of Congress. In
1878, an act of Congress condemned polygamy as a criminal offense in
the territory of Utah where Mormons tended to congregate, a religious
sect to whom polygamy was an essential tenet of dogma. Under this one
law one Reynolds was prosecuted and sentenced, and the Supreme
Court of the United States dealt with the problem in Reynolds v. United
States," and upheld his conviction. The opinion of Justice Waite in
this case reveals the rudimentary philosophy of the Court in respect to
statute disenfranchising persons practicing polygamy in Davis v. Benson, 133
U.S. 333 (1890). Then in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1925) and in
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), the Court
held that religious liberty was protected from invasion by the states by the
first amendment made applicable to the states by the fourteenth.
7 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
8 Id. at 162.
9 United States v. Kauten, 133 F. 2d 703, 708 (2d. Cir. 1943).10330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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liberties at the time, and it also shows how the notion of religion as a
purely private affair had been incorporated by the Court.. Justice Waite
held that laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
[but] they may with practices."' 2 He sided with Congress, justifying
its anti-bigamy law by pointing to the powers of Congress over terri-
tories, and by assuming something which he should have proven, name-
ly, that legislative law is in fact superior to religion as protected from
such law by the first amendment. His opinion would seem to indicate
that the first amendment prohibits Congress and the legislatures to do
something which they could not inhibit in any case, -to wit: burden
private opinions. For, matters of conscience are in any case beyond
legislative fiat and therefore can be without specific protection. Waite
maintained that to permit a man to excuse his practices on account of
his religious belief ". . . would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist
only in name under such circumstances. '13 Obviously, Waite was press-
ed to generalize exaltingly, in an ad horrendum type of argument,
and he was prompted toward this by the difficulty of having to justify
legislative restraint upon practices which, although they did not comport
with the mores of the majority, resulted from religious convictions and
religious conscience. The mandatory nature of the first amendment's
prohibition against legislative invasion into religious freedom, and yet
the necessity to justify precisely such an invasion, drove Justice Waite
to shift the argument from a qualification of exercise guaranteed by
the first amendment to an argument for freedom of mere belief rather
than exercise. Instead of making an attempt at interpreting what exer-
cise might mean in the constitutional and socio-political context, he
distorts the meaning of the first amendment. This he accomplished by
elevating the so-called Jeffersonian "wall of separation" into "an
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment,"'14
as he puts it. It permitted him to hold that ". . . congress was deprived
of all legislative power over more opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
orders." 15 Today, there is less assurance even regarding belief. Even
Leo Pfeffer argues for "free belief, perhaps, but not the free exercise
of religion."' 6 Certainly, it is a short step to implicit recognition that
there is not a wall between conscience and practice; that if practice
can be obnoxious, opinion can be too, and perhaps conscience also.
This recognition seems to contrast with Jefferson's own views, views
12 Id. at 166.
1'Id. at 167.
14 Id. at 164.
15 Ibid.
16 PFFFFER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 47.
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which the Court chose to utilize to make is constitutional interpretation
clear and authoritative. Jefferson said as follows to the Danbury
Baptists: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislatures should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church
and State.' 7 Note that Jefferson's wall stands between Church and
State, while Justice Waite, though quoting Jefferson, shifts, the object
of separation from exercise to mere belief from church to conscience,
a privatization of religion which could not be subject to legislative fiat
in any case, constitution or no constitution. It can only be subject, we
might add, to social pressure that sensitizes the intimacy of one's con-
science. But, with this accomplished Waite could divest the case under
his disposition from the relevancy of the first amendment, an opera-
tion he could perform with a privatizing notion of religion, and only
such a notion. He is thus free to state the real reasons why the act
of Congress should be upheld, referring to the mores of Western
people, to the common law of England and the colonies, finally saying:
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is,
nevertheless, in most civilized nations ... a civic contract, and
usually regulated by law. . . There cannot be a doubt that,
unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the
legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to
determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of
social life under its dominion.18
What did Waite mean by "unless restricted by some form of con-
stitution?" It appears that he had doubts on the subject; the phrase
seems an admission of awareness that his decision was not logical,
that he tried to uphold the amendment at the same instant when he
was de facto amending it, a thought which was-at the time-imper-
missible to a judge who thought he was merely interpreting the text
of the Constitution. His opinion signifies an attempt to circumvent the
uncomfortable fact that both Congress in its legislative capacity and the
Court in its adjudicative capacity had come into contact with religion
and had crossed the wall which Waite, in order to divest himself from
the possible implication of judicial amendment, exaltingly elevated
into that "authoritative declaration" below which both Congress and
the Court can then move unhindered touching exercise. Despite the
fact that Church and State, by the very nature of the inextricable
interrelationships that prevail between all activities in the human en-
vironment, are bound to be in some sort of contact, the Court dog-
matically asserts that there is a wall between them, not fully realizing
17 8 Jeff. Works 113.
1s Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
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perhaps that this can be affirmed only upon the supposition that the
Church is nothing more than a figment of an individual's imagination
which cannot be reached by any governmental means. Regardless of
the probable necessity of some form of intervention regarding polyg-
amy, the ideologizing tendency of the Court, unwittingly engaged in
masking the first amendment by a quixotic affirmation of the "wall
doctrine," is evidently protruding and easily recognizable.
However, the Court has not always been so tender on first
amendment provisions. In an Idaho case of 1878, where a statute dis-
enfranchised bigamists, Justice Field held that "crime is not the less
odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate
as 'religion.' "19 In another case of 1892, the Court held that an act
done only as a matter of religious worshiup will not protect a person
from consequences if such an act has been prohibited by law.20 Al-
though the Court has exaltingly reiterated the notion of "separation,"
pretending to an inviolability of "religion," meaning conscience, it
has allowed acts of Congress and those of states to touch upon religious
exercise without guiding Congress on legislation touching such exer-
cise. Thus, the Court gave a green light to Congress because it burdened
its thinking by an unrealistic notion instead of tackling the problem,
as it should have, head on. Had it done so it might have come up
sooner with distinctions such as the "clear and present," or "probable
danger" doctrines which it developed in response to the equally im-
portant subject of freedom of speech.
In matters of health and public welfare the Court went along with
governmental restraint notwithstanding the religious scruples and ob-
jections of individuals. About a decade ago the Court refused to con-
sider a case, thus affirming the lower court's ruling, appealed by Je-
hova's witnesses parents of a baby who was taken from them and
given a blood transfusion over their protest.21 There is no doubt about
the nature of the treatment of the Rowe brothers who claim divine
inspiration for the need to practice nudism in public were they to
display more than their religious convictions.
The most intricate and interesting problems of religious conscience
arise in connection with an individual's refusal to bear arms on ac-
19 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
20 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1892). Compare Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) in which
a Mormon bigamist was prosecuted under the Mann Act because he took an
extra wife over a state line.
21 People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 344 U.S. 824 (1935). In Bunn v. North
Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) the state of North Carolina was upheld in
prosecuting petitioner for handling a live copperhead snake even though this
was done as part of a religious service. Much earlier, the Court in Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) held against a citizen who because of
his religious faith objected to compulsory vaccination.
[Vol. 49
CHURCH AND STATE
count of his religious convictions. Congress has been granted powers
by the Constitution to raise and support an army, which implies the
power to draft citizens for purposes of defense. Now, religious con-
science forbids some people to engage in war, and the first amendment
supports their claims on this ground. In World War I the Court re-
fused conscientious objectors exemption from the draft on the basis
of their claim that their refusal was religiously motivated? 2 Then, it
later affirmed a California statute which required students at the Uni-
versity of California to take military training? 3 A student was ex-
pelled from the University because he refused to take part in para-
military exercises on account of his conscience, even though the exer-
cises were prescribed by the California statute for all schools. The
Court unanimously upheld the statute and Justice Butler explicitly re-
futed the arguments of Hamilton that it is a fixed principle of our
Constitution that it exempts conscientious objectors from bearing arms
and partaking in war. "The conscientious objector," maintained Butler,
"is relieved from the obligation to bear arms . . . because and only
because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve
him."2 4 Apart from this general point, the Court pointed out that to be
a student at a university is entirely optional, not obligatory. In 1945,
a conscientious objector was denied license to practice law in Illinois. 25
He refused to take the oath to support the Constitution of Illinois be-
cause one clause in it called for duty in the National Guard, and the
Supreme Court upheld the courts of Illinois on grounds that an officer
charged with the administration of justice in the state of Illinois and
under the Constitution of Illinois may be required to support the Con-
stitution of Illinois fully. Justice Black forcefully dissented, joined by
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, because he could not "agree that a
state can lawfully bar from a semi-public position a well qualified man
of good character solely because he entertains a religious belief which
might prompt him at some time in the future to violate a law which
has not yet been and may never be enacted. '2
Conscientious objectors have since won a victory, though their vic-
tory is really a victory for freedom for religion in the United States.
The government generously has allowed them to exempt themselves
from combatant service. The Selective Service Act of 1940, which con-
tains no specifications as to what is to be considered religious belief,
exempts conscientious objectors.2 7 So does the Selective Service Act of
22 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
23 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
241d. at 264.
25 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
26 Id. at 758.
27 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, §5, 54 Stat. 885.
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1948,28 with a qualification which remedies the omissions of 1940 in that
it defines religious belief: "Religious training and belief in this connec-
tion means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code. ' 29 The Universal Military Training and
Service Act of June, 1951, is explicit as to who may qualify as a con-
scientious objector and codifies the categories of objectors who have
been sanctioned as such by the Court.30 These advances in the statutory
provision of Congress regarding conscientious objectors have been
encouraged by Supreme Court decisions. In the case of Estep v. United
States,3 1 for the first time, the Court subjected a draft board order
to judicial scrutiny in order to guarantee fair procedure and prevent
arbitrariness; it has since continued to impose such scrutiny.n In
Dickinson v. United States33 the Court ruled that a conscientious ob-
jector cannot be questioned in his sincerity on a mere affirmation of
the board unsupported by cogent evidence. The status of conscientious
objectors is constitutionally guaranteed now, even though their social
situation exposes them to silent approbation, psychological ostracism,
and other forms of subtle discrimination. The fact that the courts have
guided Congress toward scrupulous attention for decency in the treat-
ment of these people is a most encouraging example of governmental
humanitarianism.
The Court has been quite generous regarding the admission of im-
migrants with religious and conscientious scruples insofar as the oath
requirement "to bear arms" is concerned. In Girouard v. United States3 4
the Court reversed three earlier decisions 35 in which the Court had
denied citizenship to applicants unwillingly to swear that they would
bear arms. Girouard was granted citizenship upon condition that he
will be available for non-combatant service. In Cohnsteadt v. Imnmigra-
tion and Naturalization Service3" even this was not considered essen-
tial for admission to citizenship.
28 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 265, §6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. app. §456(j).
29 Ibid.
30 Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 144, 65 Stat. 75. It recognizes some 125 types of
religious objectors. See Annot., 99 L.Ed. 443 (1954) : CORWIN, CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES, REVISED AND ANNOTATED 94-99 (1952); SIBLEY &
JACOB, CONSc~rPTION AND CONSCIENCE (1952).
3
1 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
32 United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) ; Simmons v. United States, 348
U.S. 397 (1954) ; Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1954).
33 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
34 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
35 Schwimnier v. United States, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) ; Macintosh v. United States,
283 U.S. 605 (1931) ; and United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
31 339 U.S. 901 (1950).
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The most interesting, most delicate, and judicially the most demand-
ing type of controversy between religious conscience and social and
governmental restraint arises in connection with the litigation unleashed
by Jehovah's Witnesses. This intolerantly litigious and exasperatingly
fermentive minority stormed the Courts in the forties, and their activity
provided numerous occasions for a clash of values and interests arising
from a juxtaposition of their liberty to exercise their religion and the
local police powers. One could literally speak of their "offensive"
against the police powers of various localities. The court did not always
grant them relief. In the case of Cox v. New Hampshire37 for instance,
the Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting a procession on
public streets without a license despite the Witnesses' claim that their
religious liberties were unconstitutionally encroached upon. The Court
claimed that "the authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order
upon which they ultimately depend."'  Then, in Jones v. Opelika,39
the Court again upheld a municipal ordinance which had imposed non-
discriminatory taxes upon sales of printed matter, despite the Wit-
nesses' attempt to circumvent the tax on the basis of their religious
belief. The Court set a limitation to propagation of religion of a
Witness who used "fighting words" against an officer who interfered
with his preaching in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.4° Speaking
through justice Murphy, the Court upheld the state's law prohibiting
abusive language, saying: ". .. we cannot conceive that cursing a public
officer in the exercise of religion is any sense of the term." 41 In Kovacs
v. Cooper,4" the Court affirmed the conviction of a Witness whose
sound truck emitted "loud and racous noises" which were prohibited
by the municipal ordinance of Trenton, holding the ordinance to have
been in line with reasonable limitations and regulations. However, in
the previous year, in Saia v. New York,43 a similar ordinance was
struck down on grounds that "when a city allows an official to ban
them in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppres-
sion of free communication of ideas." 4 4 The dissenters, among whom
Frankfurter was the most predictive one, always giving the benefit of
the doubt to legislative judgments rather than his judicial opinions,
3 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
38 Id. at 574.
39 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
40315 U.S. 568 (1942).
41 Id. at 571.
42336 U.S. 77 (1949).
43 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
44 Id. at 562.
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spoke of the "opportunities of aural aggression .. ./which if left/un-
controlled, the result is intrusion into cherished privacy. '4 5 Thus he
brought into focus the extent to which the exercise of religious liberties
by one group can impede the freedoms of other groups. From what
has already been said it is evident that Jehovah's Witnesses have con-
tributed greatly to the clarification of constitutional conceptions re-
garding the nature and extent of religious freedom.4" Moreover, they
have brought to awareness the fact that religious freedom and govern-
mental authority clash in a variety of contingent manners and that only
pragmatic case-by-case adjudication can effect a modicum of reconcili-
ation or harmony between these seemingly incompatible, yet nearly
equally important values.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is to recall the so called
"flag salute cases," Minerszille School District v. Gobitis4- and West
Virgin:a Board of Education v. Barnette.a8 The Gobitis children were
of an age when the laws of Pennsylvania make school attendance com-
pulsory. Yet, the children were expelled from school for refusing to
salute the American flag (pledging alegiance to it) because it was con-
trary to their religious belief, although the flag salute was prescribed
in all Minersville schools by the local board of education. The father
of the children sought court action to enjoin the local board from con-
tinuing to exact this ceremony from his children, because otherwise
he would have felt compelled to send them at exorbitant cost to private
schools where there was no mandatory requirement to salute the flag.
The local courts granted this injunction which the circuit court of
appeals affirmed.40 The Supreme Court, speaking through justice Frank-
furter, reversed the disposition of the lower courts and thus upheld
the flag salute requirement.50 Justice Frankfurter a dogmatic disciple
of Holmes, was a convinced practitioner of "judicial self-restraint,"
and he refused to follow the "preferred position" doctrine regarding
freedom guaranteed by the first amendment which was, by then, already
well established. According to this doctrine, all acts touching first
amendment freedoms are automatically infested with presumptive in-
validity. The very first paragranh of his opinion implies a denigration
of the "preferred position" by placing religious conscience in a position
-'omparable with values of national unity, in a manner, however, which
?crentuates the difficulties judges face in a free society particularly
when they aim to preserve it: "A grave responsibility confronts this
45 Id. at 563.
46 See Barber, Religious Liberty v. the Police Power: Jehovah's Witnesses, 40
Ai~i. POL. Sc. REv. 226 (1947).
47 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
48319 U.S. 624 (1943).
49 108 F. 2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1940).
50 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Court whenever in course of litigation it must reconcile the conflicting
claims of liberty and authority. But, when the liberty invoked is liberty
of conscience, and the authority is authority to safeguard the nation's
fellowship, judicial conscience is put to its severest test."5' And he
went on toning down the function of the Court to restrain only legis-
lative majorities insofar as they judge in the areas of religious free-
dom, because "to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the
guardianship of deeply cherished liberties. '52 In a sense, Justice Frank-
furter was quite willing to surrender the function of judicial review:
"The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses is not for our
independent judgment. '5 3 And yet, he was fully cognizant of the grav-
ity of the question involved: "Situations like the present are phases of
the profoundest problem confronting a democracy .... -54 But then, in
a superb gesture, he magically envelops the salutation requirement into
"an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values," r: namely
national unity as "the basis of national security." 6 With a heave and
a sigh linguistically inspiring and legally almost unexampled, at least
in its attentiveness to niceties of effect, he affects the ceremony of salut-
ing the flag with an aura that overshadows religion and religious
scruples. Perhaps, sensing the legitimacy of exemption in the case at
hand, he was prompted to exalt the flag salute requirement into an
almost indispensable ritual of national survival, which then enabled
him to uphold the Minersville School Board instead of the Jehovah's
Witnesses.
The dissent of Justice Stone was a more promising and a more
generous gesture, and quite down to earth insofar as national security
was concerned. Stone begins his dissent by emphasizing the loyalty of
the Gobitis family notwithstanding their refusal to let their children
salute the American flag. He maintains that "constitutional guarantees
of personal liberty are not always absolutes,"' 7 and he admits that they
may be restrained from time to time.
But it is a long step, . .. to the position that government
may, as a supposed educational measure ... compel public af-
firmation which violates their religious conscience.... [E]ven
if we believe, that such compulsion will contribute to national
unity, there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism which
are the sources of national unity, than by compelling the pupil
5 Id. at 591.
52 Id. at 600.
53 Id. at 598.
54 Id. at 596.
551d. at 595.
56 Ibid.
57 Id. at 602.
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to affirm that which he does not believe and by commanding a
form of affirmance which violates his religious convictions." 5
And then, Justice Stone strikes at the root of the Frankfurter pose:
"There have been but few infringements of personal liberty by the state
which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of right-
eousness and the public good."59 Justice Stone authenticates the mean-
ing of the First Amendment, because to him it is inconceivable that
the framers of the Constitution "intended or rightly could have left
any latitude for a legislative judgment that the compulsory expression
of belief which violates religious convictions would better serve the
public interest than their protection.""6 This was in retort to Justice
Frankfurter's claim that "nullification of legislation cannot be justified
by attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for which
there is no historic warrant."61
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,62 the Court
followed Justice Stone's dissent in the Gobitis case, driving Justice
Frankfurter into a dissent which reiterated the traditional Holmesian
position of judicial restraint or "judicial abdication."
II. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
The first amendment not only forbids Congress to prohibit the free
exercisd of religion, it also forbids Congress to make any law "respect-
ing an establishment of religion." This clause is designed to guarantee
what is called the separation of Church and State.
Before one can discuss the first amendment provision in this re-
spect, it would be useful to say something plausible about the notion
of "Church." When we speak of the "Church" we do not always en-
tertain clear-cut conceptions. In the dynamic and constantly changing
environment which molds and reflects our conceptions, this is probably
not even desirable. Loosely speaking, we may define it as the institu-
tional realization of man's religious aspirations; or as an institution-
alized communication of man, where the content of communication is
religion. The Church thus defined is more than religion, and nothing
without religion. Religion is the sine qua non, the necessary although
not the sufficient condition of churchly existence. The word etymologi-
cally derives from a translation of Greek ekklesia which in early Chris-
tian communities denoted moments of togetherness and electedness.
The early Christian communities expressed through it a claim to be
the true people, 63 or the God's own people . 4 However, the more
58 Id. at 603-04.59 Id. at 604.
60 Id. at 605.
61 Id. at 594.
62319 U.S. 624 (1943).
63 Gal. 6:16; Rom. 9:6; Hebr. 2:16.
642 Coa. 6:18; lPet. 2:9.
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original denotation of "that which belong to the Lord" was termed
kyriakon or kyriaka in Greek. And this is phonetically closer to the
English term "Church" or the Germanic "Kirche." It was first applied
to the place of worship probably by the Aryan Goths. Thus, "Church,"
in its linguistic as well as in its social sense connotes two elements; a
definite place of congregation and a particular practical association
with it.
Even Protestant religious thinkers are by now forced to abandon
a quite compulsive attitude toward religion engendered by their juxta-
position to Catholicism and the Church which had led them to a theo-
logico-psychological bias against organized religion, a bias not always
unwarranted.
The notion of "establishment" respecting which Congress is pro-
hibited to legislate, is interpreted by the Court to mean separation
which is complete. While the Court is rather committed to the idea
of complete separation, the real problem arises in connection with the
unavoidable contacts between Church and State which pose the ques-
tion whether the State is to be neutral among religions, or neutral
between religion and non-religion, religion and atheism. In the first in-
stance, the assumption prevails that society is religious, while in the
second instance the state is facing a standard of irreligiousness which
it will not be able fully to meet. Since religious groups are most
anxious to perpetuate and extend themselves, which is naturally ac-
complished through educational means, and since education has in-
creasingly become a public responsibility, the most crucial centers of
controversy arise from two possible sources: from government aid to
religious organizations in and out of school and from the intrusion of
religion into the governmentally financed public schools. Before the
Court authoritatively defined in the EversonGs case a disestablishment
notion of the first amendment and implanted it into the "due process
of law" clause of the fourteenth amendment to involve local govern-
ments as well, the Court, in Cochrane v. Louisiana State Board of
Education66 held that the state may provide all school children-includ-
ing parochial school children-with free textbooks, for to do so was
not a service to the parorh;al .chools but to tbe child, and tax money
may validly be spent for a private purpose. The Everson case was
based on a taxpayer's suit wherein an act of the New Jersey Board of
Education was challenged for authorizing reimbursement of transport
in the range of about forty dollars annually to parents of children
who attended parochial schools. The action of the Board was in pur-
suance of the New Jersey statute which required the boards of edu-
65 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
66 281 U.S. 370 (1929).
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cation of the districts to provide for transportation of school children.
One taxpayer challenged the validity of reimbursement to parochial
school children on the following constitutional grounds: first, taxes were
taken from some and bestowed upon others for private purposes; and
second, the statute and ordinance provided support to church schools
in violation of the first amendment establishment prohibition. The
Court, through Justice Black, rejected the contention that the law had
private character. Nevertheless, while agreeing with the second con-
tention in principle, Justice Black found it inapplicable as a limitation
in the case at hand. He argued as follows, defining the meaning of
disestablishment:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can it
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or dis-
belief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities of in-
stitutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation be-
tween Church and State. '67
Raising here an absolutely untouchable standard of disestablishment
by adamantly reiterating that "no tax in any amount, large or small,
..." Justice Black appears to contradict himself without compunction:
"measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First Amendment
prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus
fares of parochial school children . ,,.8 But this ambivalence, witting
or unwitting, is clearly a catapult to any direction on which the Court
may be willing to take us. The stored-up aggregates of a sectarian
dogmatism, essentially alien to the pragmatic tradition and the prag-
matic requirements of a more complex and quite contingent constitu-
tional situation, bides its time, and not for long. In effect, the decision,
while deciding in favor of the Board of Education, leans with a
vengeance towards intimating the unconstitutionality of like enterprises.
Justice Black winds up his opinion by confirming the "law": "The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest
6r7 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
68 Id. at 17.
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breach." 9 It is almost as if the tail wagged the dog, due perhaps to the
fact that the conscience of the one interpreting separation accepts
secularism as the context to be kept separated. Jackson's dissent hits
the nail on its head: "The undertones of the opinion, advocating com-
plete and uncompromising separation of church from state, seem utterly
discordant with its conclusion." 70 He pokes fun at Black by recalling
the case of Julia "who according to Byron's reports, 'whispering I will
ne'er consent,'-consented .... -71 However, Jackson, while noting the
ambivalence of Black's opinion, runs into the opposite fallacy: "One
of our basic rights is to be free of taxation to support a transgression
of the constitutional command that the authorities 'shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... , 72 The logic of Justice
Jackson holds that prohibition of such a transgression is a basic right.
But it is one thing to find by judicial means what constitutes a trans-
gression, applying the constitutional precepts to a complex reality, and
quite another thing to presume that a public policy transgresses when
it employs the spending powers in a manner which may indirectly
benefit even parochial schools. The constitutional provisions for non-
establishment as a condition of freedom are certainly wise, but it would
be foolish to presume that these provisions can be applied as swiftly
and streamlinedly as they sound when proposed. Their meaning, in the
daily realities of an evolving and fluctuating situation, receives relevance
from the character of their subject matter which cannot be ascertained
without a continuous and patient search of what is feasible and what
is not, what can be included in it and what cannot.
The underlying basis of Justice Jackson's dissenting position is
a peculiar conception of the first amendment which completely de-
taches religion from "the realm of things which could directly or in-
directly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole
or in part at taxpayer's expense. '7 3 In other words, it is his privatizing
notion of religion which coaxes religion injudicially out of existence
in a social world, a world becoming so pervasively public or affected
with governmental activities, that the entire problem of disestablish-
ment may well merit serious reconsideration. Justice Rutledge, with
whom Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton agreed, connected
on this dogmatism, maintaining somewhat abruptly and strenuously:
"The Amendment's purpose . . . was to uproot all such relationships
[and] create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority. '7 4 He comes quite close to segre-
69 Id. at 18.
70 Id. at 19.
71 Ibid.
72 Id. at 22.
73!d. at 26.
4 Id. at 31.
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gating religion from the world and relegating it into a figment: "The
dual prohibition makes that function/religion/altogether private."75
(Emphasis added.) Concretization of Justice Rutledge's opinion reveals
its utter meaninglessness. When speaking of the expenditure of money
for private purposes, i.e. religion, he holds it to be contrary to the first
amendment since it respects establishment; while when money is ex-
pended for public purposes, it cannot be allowed to benefit religion
which is a private affair. Hence, money spent by the state must in no
case benefit religion, directly or indirectly. One may notice this cumu-
lative broadening of the public domain against the alleged purely pri-
vate domain, religion, which is by implication leading to a displace-
ment of the private domain by the mandatorily taken provisions of
the first amendment and absolutisitcally infused sectarian dogmatism
which unfolds itself as follows: "There cannot be freedom of religion,
safeguarded by the state, and intervention by the Church or its agen-
cies in the state's domain or dependency on its largesse. ' 17 s The question
to be asked from Rutledge is where in his opinion could he say quite
securely and confidently that the domain of the state ends if he had
no referent in religion? It is hardly conceivable that his answer could
be clear. But to be incapable to delimit the domain of the state, except
by reference to religion conceived as abstract privacy, is to make an
insufficiently camouflaged bow to a totalitarian conception of the state.
For it seems that, since the only delimitation which the state would
here receive in such a philosophy is obtained from an abstract notion
of religion, the public domain expands greatly. This is to abdicate the
liberty of religious exercise, the possibility of meaningful establish-
ment, and the possibility of effectively delimiting the public domain
by an exercise of, rather than a dream of, religion. Possibly, it is to
secularize the socio-political context to such an extent that it will in
its entirety have to receive a sacral aura overriding religion and de-
velop a Rousseauian totalistic notion of the state. This is why Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne maintains:
The gradual pervasion of American society by government has
caused a number of religious organizations to fear that an un-
yielding neutrality in the First Amendment must inevitably re-
sult in the gradual shrinking of organized religion. In a very
real sense, there is cause for this alarm: not because the Estab-
lishment Clause itself expresses any hostility toward religion,
but simply because the neutralized zone of governmental activity
continues to expand, gradually squeezing religion from larger
and larger areas of the total environment. . . .As government
services expand, however, and as more of the economy and en-
vironment is occupied by the increasing, public, governmental
75 Id. at 52.
76Id. at 53.
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sector of our society, the net effect of the shift is to confine
religion to the ever shrinking domain of the relatively diminish-
ing private sector.
77
In McCollum v. Board of Education,-, a case entertained by the
Supreme Court because of the appellant's residence, taxpayer interest
in Champaign, Illinois, as well as her parental interest, the Court an-
nulled the "released time" program in the public schools, because the
".. . use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the
close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious coun-
cil in promoting religious education. ' ' 79 The Court held this to be
"beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-sup-
ported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith."8 0 Thus, the program fell squarely under the first amendment
ban. Curiously and significantly, it was again Justice Black who wrote
the opinion, quoting his unreachable standard of separation with more
facility this time. He distinguished the case from the Everson decision
sufficiently to allow him to uphold Mrs. McCollum against the Cham-
paign Board. Justice Frankfurter was more subtle in his concurring
opinion, and necessarily so, since he abandoned his cherished Holmes-
ian position of restraint and indulged here in activism under quite
unpragmatic assumptions despite lip-service to the protracted process
of exclusion and inclusion: ". . . the mere formulation of a relevant
Constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a problem,
not its answer.""' Then, after an excellent review of the historical
development, he stated that: "Separation means separation, not some-
thing less."'8 2 Justice Jackson, also concurring, is more realistic, be-
cause he knows that "the task of separating the secular from the re-
ligious education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy. . . . It
is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in the
Constitution one word to help us judges to decide where the secular
ends and the sectarian begins in education. '8 3 He comments that to
follow the wall doctrine is ". . . to decree a uniform, rigid, and if we
are consistent, an unchanging standard for countless school boards
representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ
from each other but which themselves from time to time change at-
titudes. It seems to me that to do so is to allow zeal for our own ideas
of what is good in public instruction to imbue us to accept the role
77 Von Alstyne, Constitution Separation of Church and State: The Quest for
a Coherent Position, 57 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 865, 881 (1963).7S333 U.S. 203 (1948).
79 Id. at 209.
so Id. at 210.
81 Id. at 212.
821d. at 231.
S3 Id. at 237-38.
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of a super board of education for every school district in the nation." '
This concurring opinion reads more like a dissent, and as a matter of
fact, it is more forthright and trenchant than the lonely dissent of
Justice Reed. Justice Reed followed Justice Jackson in reiterating that
"a rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech"85 re-
ferring, of course, to the "wall doctrine." Besides, "the practices of the
federal government offer many examples of this kind of "aid" [which
the court here holds unconstitutional] by the state to religion. '8 6 The
Congress of the United States has a chaplain for each House who daily
invokes divine blessings and guidance for the proceedings. The armed
forces have commissioned chaplains from early days, who conduct
public services in accordance with the liturgical requirements of their
resepective faiths, ashore and afloat, employing for that purpose, prop-
erty belonging to the United States. Under the Servicemen's Readjust-
ment Act of 194487 eligible veterans may receive training at govern-
ment expense for the ministry in denominational schools. Justice Reed
concludes that affirming this type of aid is not unconstitutional and
that to read the Constitution otherwise is to conflict with the accepted
habits of the American people. Here, he was developing an idea of
neutrality on the part of the government among religions, rather than
the idea of neutrality between religion and irreligion.
The McCollum decision day did not pass without connotation.
Catholic militants, and other defenders of what seems common sense,
attacked the Court most vigorously. Father John C. Murray, a leading
Catholic expert on the Church and State problem, challenged the
Everson and lcCollum decisions of the Court as an "irredeemable
piece of sectarian dogmatism,"88 while Professor Corwin chided the
Court for acting as a "national school board,"8 as Justice Jackson
himself had suggested in his concurrent opinion in the McCollum de-
cision. Professor Corwin suggested that ". . . the Court, by its decision
in the McCollum case, has itself promulgated a law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion, contrary to the express prohibition of the
first amendment."9 Particularly Professor Corin's reference to the
Frothinghiam v. Mellon 1 decision is remembered: Justice Sutherland
maintained that ". . . the party who invokes the power must be able to
show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
S4 Id. at 237.
85 Id. at 247.
86 Id. at 253.
87 Act of June 22, 1944, ch. 268, §400, 58 Stat. 289.
88 Murray, Ltw or Prepossession, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Mc-
Closkey ed. 1957).
89 Corwin, Supreme Court as a National School Board, 23 THOUGHT 665 (1948).
90 Id. at 681.
91262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally. '92 Only Justice Jackson raised
doubts on this matter in his concurrent opinion. Professor Corwin
rightly points out that the Court, entertaining jurisdiction in the Mc-
Collum case, implicitly enlarged jurisdiction on the first amendment and
reduced the doctrine of special interest to a fiction by allowing a tax-
payer with a general interest in the law and a parent of a child ad-
mittedly a "problem child" to entertain a suit. When the Court re-
ceived on its dockets a similar case on the New Jersey "Bible reading"
program it held with Justice Jackson in a six to three decision in
Dorernus v. Board of Education" that there was "no case or con-
troversy" involved here, for the appellant had no standing to raise the
constitutional question, because "Bible reading" did not touch the
pocket of the appellant, and in addition the question of constitutionality
became "moot" meanwhile since the child had graduated from school.
Justices Douglas, Burton, and Reed thought otherwise in their dis-
sent. At any rate, the effect of the Court's refusal was to uphold the
New Jersey court which held that "The reading does not, obviously,
affect or tend to affect the setting up, or the establishment, of a re-
ligion and, just as obviously, it does not prohibit the free exercise of
any religion."9 4 It is interesting to observe the tone of the New Jersey
decision which reflects the strong dose of religious criticism the Court
had received after the McCallum decision:
The American people are and always have been theistic ...
The influence, which that force contributed to our origins and
the direction which it has given to our progress are beyond
calculation.... Our way of life is on challenge. Organized athe-
istic society is making a determined drive for supremacy by
conquest as well as by infiltration. . . We are at a crucial hour
in which it may behoove our people to conserve all of the ele-
ments which have made our land what it is. Faced with this
threat to the continuance of elements deeply embedded in our
national life the adoption of a public policy with respect thereto
is a reasonable function to be performed by those on whom re-
sponsibility lies.95
One may note here pertinently that the measure of genuine concern
for authentic humanitarian values depends on more than an exalted,
though in itself laudable, affirmation of what this Court happens to
hold about our heritage. What we mean is particularly exemplified in
a similar decision in New Jersey where Justice Vanderbuilt in Tudor
v. Board of Education96 held that the distribution of the "Gideon
92 Id. at 488.
93 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
945 N.J. 435, 75 A. 2d 880, 887 (1950).
9 Id. at 888.
06 14 N.J. 31, 100 A. 2d 857 (1953).
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Bible" is a type of "establishment" contrary to the first amendment
provision, basing much of its evidence upon the psychiatric findings,
and upon the damaging effect upon the children's psyches.
In Zorach v. Clauson,9 7 the Court took the opportunity to retreat
from its extreme holding in McCollum, upholding the New York "re-
leased time" program where classes in religion were held outside the
public school buildings; six Justices considered this a sufficiently dif-
ferent element of the case to warrant evading the McCollum precedent.
Black, Jackson and Frankfurter dissented. The former two Justices
saw here no difference from the McCollum rule while Justice Frank-
furter, again side-stepping his habitual position of judicial self-restraint,
held that "released time" is really a compulsion. Justice Douglas' opin-
ion shows an improvement upon the absolutistic opinions of the Ever-
son and the McCollum decisions in which he went along:
The first Amendment . .. does not say that in every aid all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and
religion would be alien to each other-hostile, suspicious, and
even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even
property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render
police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who
helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate
the Constitution. . . . The appeals to the Almighty that run
through out laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be
flouting the First Amendment."9
Justice Douglas hits the pith of the problem involved in all these
cases: ". . . we find no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its
weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influ-
ence." 99 Justice Black reveals his real attachment to the eighteenth
century conception of disestablishment in a world of the twentieth cen-
tury, dissenting on grounds similar to those which compelled him to
lead in the Everson and the McCollum decisions. While setting forth
the thoughts and practices of a century in which an agrarian civiliza-
tion could still afford absolutistic notions, he appears to bypass the
realities of the twentieth century in which ". . . government . . . takes
up more and more of the time of the people, and as more and more
non-religious institutions are the beneficiaries of governmental aid,
religion which is not similarly aided must suffer in the competition."' 01
97343 U.S. 306 (1952).
98 Id. at 312.
99 Id. at 314.
100 KONVITZ, BILL OF RIGHTS READER, 1032 (1956).
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It is somewhat hypocritical to maintain on one hand that the constitu-
tional provision aims at establishing freedom of religion and then on
the other that this is possible only on the basis of an extra-judicial,
almost legislative absolutism, which ultimately burdens the free exer-
cise, notwithstanding the plain fact that even if one conceives of re-
ligion as an entirely private affair-which it is not-total separation
is still not feasible under modern condtiions. It is for this reason that
Robert Horn states that "... if the state withheld what it alone can
provide, it would deprive Churches not only of their liberty, but their
life. The state which refused to give churches certain minimal public
aid would in fact be passing upon them the dread sentence of out-
lawry."10
Since the Zorach decision the court has tacitly accepted the in-
feasibility of complete separation. Instead, the Court has concerned
itself with ascertaining, in each individual case, whether the legislation
in question was designed to benefit religious groups, or whether it
was serving primarily secular purposes.1 0 2 Even if legislation is shown
to be aiding religious groups, the Court will not strike it down, if it
can be shown that the legislature cannot otherwise serve the secular
purpose as well. These considerations on the part of the Court do not
avoid examination into the motives of legislatures, but they do involve
examination of the overall effects of legislation and including an inde-
pendent judgment as to what purpose or purposes specific legislation
serves, and may result in the annulment of a law in one state and the
legitimation of an almost identical law in another state, depending
upon the extent to which the Establishment Clause has been violated
by an element of conscious manipulation of secular institutions to ad-
vance sectarian interests. 0 3 This pragmatic position of the Court is
an entirely laudable development, and is unlikely to cause religion too
much suffering in consequence of the inevitable expansion of the public
domain.
In conclusion, one can say that an overbearing lesson can be ex-
tracted from this discussion of judicial mediation of religious freedom
and governmental authority in the United States; that neither religious
or governmental activity can manifest itself unrelated to the other, and
neither can evade encounter with the other. Consequently, one must
expect a constant interaction between religious and political activities,
a great deal of overlapping in their legitimate spheres of influence, and
a mutual interdependence.
101 HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONsTITUTION 52 (1956).
102 See generally Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court
Decision, 53 Am. POL. Scr. REV. 777 (1959) and Von Alstyne, Constitutional
Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57
Am. PoL Sci. REv. 865 (1963).
103 See Von Alstyne, supra note 102.
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